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LAW AND ORDER COMES TO "DODGE CITY":
TREASURY'S NEW RETURN PREPARER AND IRS
PRACTICE STANDARDS
GWEN THAYER HANDELA.N*
Tax policy discussions tend to take the shape of proposals for change.
I depart from that tradition to offer support for recent United States
Treasury Department (Treasury) efforts to reinvigorate the self-assessment
system. Almost seven years ago, proposed amendments to Circular 230
which sought to redefine practitioner standards of federal tax advice set off
a maelstrom.' There followed studies, reports, revised taxpayer and preparer
penalty legislation, notices, proposed and final regulations, and another
round of proposed revisions to Circular 230 that generally would conform
the standards of practice before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to those
established by the preparer penalty regulations.
There has been and will continue to be no shortage of critics of the
new standards. I offer the observation that the Treasury has contributed
significantly to public law jurisprudence by articulating for practitioners
expectations of respect for legitimate lawmaking authority and discipline in
identifying the requirements of "law." Additionally, the Treasury implicitly
has defined "law" in terms that are meaningful to the taxpaying public,
which has been alienated by the appearance of lawlessness created by
lawyers' and accountants' insistence on broad discretion to supply to "am-
biguous" statutory terms virtually any content most favorable to clients.
The strength of the new standards is that they require practitioners to
defer, in resolving ambiguities in the revenue statutes, to legislative, judicial
and administrative "authority" as defined under the accuracy-related penalty
regulations. 2 The objectivity achieved by this limitation vastly improves the
administrability of the Treasury standards over the standards of the Amer-
ican Bar Association (ABA)' and the American Institute of Certified Public
* Associate Professor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lexington,
Virginia. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1981, University of Michigan. The author wishes to acknowledge
the invaluable contributions of her colleague Tim Philipps, her research assistant Stephanie
Lefebvre Armstrong, and the Frances Lewis Law Center.
1. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113 (1986) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10) (proposed July 18,
1986). Treasury Department Circular No. 230, codified at 31 C.F.R. Part 10, prescribes rules
governing practice before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). A violation of these rules may
result in suspension or disbarment from representing clients before the Service. The proposed
regulations would have required advised return positions to be "reasonable, meritorious and
made in good faith" and would have prohibited practitioners from advising positions that
would subject a client to the substantial understatement penalty, then set forth at Internal
Revenue Code § 6661.
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991).
3. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 352 (1985),
reprinted in 39 TAx LAW. 631 (1986) [hereinafter Formal Op. 85-352].
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Accountants (AICPA).4 Moreover, the Treasury's approach soundly, if not
explicitly, rejects the proposition, inherent in the ABA and AICPA stan-
dards, that taxpayers and their advisers (or even academics) may substitute
their own private speculation for authoritative judgments. While further
clarification would be in order, Congress and the Treasury should resist the
pressure to reverse course. Bringing law and order to the tax return by
prescribing professional conduct consistent with a broadly accessible concept
of the rule of law may breathe new life into our self-assessment system.
The regulations assume "law" to mean "positive law," that is, norms
established "by the authority of the state as contrasted with natural law or
a body of ideal precepts." ' 5 Many of us may wish that we were subject to
tax under principles of natural justice, but the content of those principles
is the subject of some dispute and so, as a practical matter, varies with the
identity of the person applying them. Most accept that members of the
legislature, executive officials, and judges, who are the final arbiters, resolve
conflicting notions of what principles of justice ought to govern in our
polity. We may attain for our personal principles the status of law only by
advancing them for adoption by these politically authorized decisionmakers.
Whereas individuals have considerable power to define private law rights
and duties, our judgments as individuals are not recognized as authoritative
pronouncements of public law.
These propositions may seem unremarkable; but, as related in Section
I below, for some time the federal tax system has tolerated practitioners'
assessing a client's tax liability in accordance with their personal preferences
as to the requirements of the tax laws. One costume in which personal
preference can dress is as a prediction of a position's likelihood of prevailing
in an adversarial proceeding, which is the ethical standard governing return
advice adopted by the ABA and the AICPA. The ABA permits advising a
return position that has a "realistic possibility of success in litigation,
' 6
and the AICPA permits advising a position that has a "realistic possibility
of being upheld, administratively or judicially, on its merits."
'7
The legitimacy of this formulation of the task of tax advising rests on
the Holmesian or realist definition of law as a prediction of what the courts
will say it is,8 a definition that seems entirely consistent with the notion
that law is the product of politically authorized decisionmakers. However,
the danger of a realist definition of law in the hands of a decisionmaker
without authority is that legal reasoning may become fortunetelling, an
exercise of imagination influenced by wishful thinking, creative rather than
4. AICPA Statement on Responsibilities in Tax Practice (1988 Rev.) No. 1 (Aug. 1988)
[hereinafter SRTP No. 11.
5. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1770 (1971).
6. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 3, reprinted in 39 TAx LAW at 633.
7. SRTP No. 1, supra note 4, .02a.
8. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAgv. L. Rav. 457, 461 (1897) ("The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.").
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compliant. Since the practitioner may or may not conclude what a court
would, the decision is not the equivalent of the judgment of an authorized
decisionmaker but is simply the view of a private individual acting on behalf
of private interests.
Although rarely phrased in these terms, 9 and not explicitly addressed in
the regulations, the appropriate definition of law may be the core issue that
has divided tax practitioners and the government. Differing theoretical
perspectives may have had the practical consequence of fueling distrust and
increasing animosity on both sides. Theoretical differences also may have
separated practitioners from the public, leaving the impression that tax
practitioners are lawless mercenaries for those who can afford their services.
The articulated differences center on how to interpret "doubtful" or "ques-
tionable" statutory requirements and the propriety of requiring that, where
the IRS has ruled on the meaning of a provision, practitioners either follow
the IRS's view or disclose that they are not. Practitioners have protested
what they regard as forced servitudeto the IRS. The IRS has accused the
practicing community of dishonoring the obligation to corral advice within
the confines of the requirements of law.
As Section II explains, the new Treasury standards reject a lawyer's
definition of law in favor of a good old-fashioned lay definition: "law" is
what is on the books. Although lawyers and accountants have adopted a
perhaps more theoretically respectable definition of law, prediction of what
the courts would decide is an inherently speculative and subjective under-
taking that results in according private individuals unaccountable lawmaking
authority.
I. THE OLD REGIME
Under the original preparer penalty statute enacted in 1976,10 tax advisers
adopted the view that they were allowed broad discretion to pick and choose
the regulations with which they would comply. Former section 6694(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) purportedly penalized a practitioner1 if
any part of a client's understatement were due to the adviser's "negligent
or intentional disregard of rules and regulations." However, the regulations
under section 6694 permitted a practitioner to take a position contrary to
9. But see Gwen T. Handelman, Counseling Ordered Liberty: Reply to a Commentary,
9 VA. TAx REv. 781 (1990); Gwen T. Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9
VA. TAX REv. 77 (1989); Judson L. Temple, The Tax Return and the Standard of Accuracy-
Part II, 16 Ray. TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 64 (1992); Judson L. Temple, The Tax Return and
the Standard of Accuracy-Part I, 15 REv. TAX'N OF INDIvIDuAlS 315 (1991); David B.
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HAgv. L. REv. 468 (1990). See also Gwen T.
Handelman, Sisters in Law: Gender and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 3 UCLA WOEN'S
L.J. (forthcoming 1993) (discussing approaches to defining law).
10. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203(b), 90 Stat. 1520, 1689 (1976)
(amended 1989).
11. Id. Both former and current § 6694 penalties apply to "income tax return preparers"
as defined under Code § 7701.
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rules or regulations if the position were taken "in good faith" and supported
by a "reasonable basis" for concluding that the rule or regulation did not
accurately reflect the Code. 2 The regulations tracked the language of ABA
Ethics Opinion 314,13 which came to be known as the "laugh-aloud"
standard, 4 but both the ABA and AICPA standards went beyond setting
"reasonable basis" as adequate support for a position contrary to a regu-
lation. Both organizations adopted the view that practitioners could establish
"good faith" absent disclosure that a position contradicted a regulation.
Reporting a position without such disclosure would seem to constitute
representing a position as consistent with "law," and a taxpayer's knowing
disregard of regulations without disclosure was not excused as undertaken
in good faith.1- However, tax advisers implicitly assumed the unique privilege
of challenging administrative rulings in their offices without raising the issue
to the Service or before the courts, except in the unlikely event of audit.
In short, the standard of return advice was set at the same level required
to assert a position in litigation, which necessarily involves affording the
opposition the opportunity to rebut, even though the chance of actual
adversarial confrontation with respect to a return position was remote.
Unlike taxpayers, practitioners were assured of the ethical propriety of
asserting their opposition to rules and regulations surreptitiously.
The old preparer penalty regime not only rested on a legal realist
definition of law, but also seems to have borrowed from the era of laissez-
faire a view that administrative agencies are illegitimate interlopers in a
domain to which only the judiciary should be acknowledged as rightful
heir.' 6 Even as courts have increasingly recognized the lawmaking authority
of administrative agencies,' 7 tax professionals seem to cling to the common
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(1) & (4) (as amended in 1978). See Richard C. Stark,
IMPACT Makes Fundamental Changes in Civil Penalties, 72 J. TAX'N 132, 136 (1990)
(discussing that prior to amendments, § 6694 allowed preparer to take position contrary to
rules if position taken in "good faith").
13. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
14. See Michael J. Graetz, Too Little, Too Late, TAX TrmEs, Feb. 1987, at 17 (discussing
practical results of reasonable basis standard).
15. See, e.g., Forseth v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 845 F.2d 746 (7th Cir.
1988); Warrensburg Bd. & Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1107 (1981) (rejecting claims
of good faith due to taxpayer's failure to disclose). Cf. Pullman, Inc. v. Commissioner, 8
T.C. 292 (1947); Wesley Heat Treating Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 10 (1958); Belz Inv.
Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1209 (1979) (citing disclosure as excuse for otherwise applicable
penalty). See, e.g., Gwen T. Handelman, Caring Reasonably, 20 CAPITAL U. L. REv. 345
(1991).
16. In the early part of the twentieth century, even regulatory statutes were regarded as
the stepchild of the law contrasted with the perceived "integrity and coherence" of judge-
made doctrines. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 5 (1990).
17. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Wagner
Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 948 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991); Johnson City Medical Ctr. Hosp. v. United
States, 783 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Tenn. 1992). See, e.g., Linda Galler, Chevron and the
Administrative Regulation of Indexation: Challenging the Cooper Memorandum, 56 TAX NoTEs
1791 (1992).
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law bias that the basis of administrative authority is expertise rather than
governmental power. It follows from such a view that administrative pron-
ouncements are no more authoritative than the views of an equally expert
practitioner." Certainly the practicing community has so regarded revenue
rulings. The conventional rationale is recorded in the preamble to the final
accuracy-related penalties: "One commentator stated that a revenue ruling
should not be treated as a 'rule' [for purposes of the penalty for disregard
of rules and regulations] because (1) a revenue ruling does not constitute a
rule under the Administrative Procedure Act ... and (2) a revenue ruling
is only the contention of one party and is not subjected to the give and
take of a public comment process."' 9 Tax advisers seem loathe to respect
administrative pronouncements as a form of "law," let alone defer to
agency interpretations of the statutes it is charged with administering.
The routine dismissal by tax practitioners of administrative authority
has exacerbated the uncertain application of the internal revenue laws that
was the natural consequence of a realist definition of law. Perhaps it is to
be expected that the jurisprudence of an era that favored private ordering
proves hostile, or at least peculiarly unhelpful, to effective regulation of
private behavior in the public interest, such as self-assessment. It is apparent
that practitioner predictions will not achieve certainty and uniformity in the
application of the tax laws. The interpretive venture incorporates so many
considerations and sources that the outcome rests on the weight of a given
factor. Some practitioners even have narrowed the endeavor to hypothesizing
what the Supreme Court would decide if the matter were before it.20 Since
the Supreme Court rarely actually supplies any answers, under this formu-
18. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for Judicial Review of IRS Revenue
Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REv. 841, 852 (1992). Professor Galler states:
While the IRS undoubtedly employs many intelligent, experienced, and accomplished
individuals, it is far from clear that the individual or collective dexterity of this
group distinguishes it from tax practitioners in the private sector. To accord special
consideration to the IRS because its employees have superior skills gives the govern-
ment an unwarranted advantage with no literal basis because, in the logical extreme,
the same people comprise the public and private sectors. Indeed, the entrances to
the Treasury and IRS buildings in Washington might be described figuratively, if
not literally, as revolving doors, considering the numbers of professionals who pass
through those portals on their way from private practice to government service, and
then pass through once again as they return to the private sector.
Id. Professor Galler's article, however, is addressed to the quite different question of whether
courts must defer to revenue rulings. I tend to agree with her that courts need not defer
because the judiciary enjoys independent political authority. See Gwen T. Handelman, Zen
and the Art of Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAUL
L. Rav. 611, 618-19 (1991). The Treasury apparently agrees. See text following note 66 infra.
19. IRS Final Regulations on Accuracy-related Penalty, 56 Fed. Reg. 67492, 67494
(1991). Revenue rulings "represent classic examples of interpretive rules." Galler, supra note
18, at 861 n.110. The Administrative Procedures Act mandates notice and comment procedures
for "legislative," but not "interpretive," rules (whether issued in the form of revenue rulings
or regulations). 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1988).
20. See, e.g., William L. Raby, Using "'Responsibility Level" Language to Control Tax
Work Assignments and Channel Client Communication, 53 TAx Nom's 1281, 1281 (1991).
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lation the requirements of the "law" can remain extremely flexible indefi-
nitely.
The conduct of most practitioners probably has been consistent with
legitimate jurisprudential operating assumptions. However, it has appeared
to the Service and to a substantial portion of the taxpaying public that
practitioners adopt fanciful positions simply to avail their clients of the
audit lottery. Not only has free-wheeling advice of professionals resulted in
the noncompliance of their clients, but many taxpayers untrained in tax law
have sought to imitate practitioner exploitation of ambiguity, resulting in
negligent or even frivolous legal arguments.
The professions have made efforts to respond to public perceptions of
wrongdoing, but both the ABA's and the AICPA's "realistic possibility"
standard incorporated an unparalleled license to deviate from the prescrip-
tions of lawful authority by substituting the adviser's judgment for "law." '2'
While individuals may limit our private contractual obligations, our judg-
ments as individuals are not recognized as authoritative definitions of public
rights and duties. Yet both the ABA and the AICPA have asserted the
privilege of their membership to engage in lawmaking. Perhaps neither
would articulate their position in these terms, but both organizations adopted
standards that permit a practitioner to advise a client to report without
disclosure, as an accurate statement of the requirements of the internal
revenue laws, a position supported only by a "good faith argument" for
"modification" or even "reversal of existing law."2 Certainly, in formu-
lating arguments in litigation, "account must be taken of the law's ambi-
guities and potential for change," 2 but even litigators are not permitted by
ethical rules to misrepresent a desired outcome as the current state of the
law.24
II. "REALISTIC POSSIBILITY" AS CONFORMING TO POLITICAL AuTzoIuTY
In 1989, Congress sought to improve compliance through a new regime
of preparer penalties.25 Nevertheless, in enacting new penalty legislation,
Congress adopted a standard that "generally reflects the professional con-
duct standards applicable to lawyers and to certified public accountants.
'" 2
Congress revised former section 6694(a) to impose a $250 penalty for a
client's understatement attributable to a position for which there is "not a
realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits" on a preparer who
"knew (or reasonably should have known)" of the position.
21. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 3; SRTP No. 1, supra note 4.
22. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 3 (emphasis added); SRTP No. 1, supra note 4,
.02a & .07 (emphasiz added).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 cmt. (1992).
24. Id. Rule 3.3.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 1396 (1989) (expressing belief that
new standard is stricter than present law), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2866.
26. Id.
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The Treasury, charged with the task of implementing a standard that
simultaneously sought both to improve and to reflect the status quo,
employed terms similar to those of the ABA and AICPA. However, the
preparer penalty regulations represent important departures from previous
standards of professional conduct. The regulations define the statutory
"realistic possibility" standard as essentially equivalent to "substantial
authority," 27 which generally requires that an undisclosed position conform
to the product of politically authorized decisionmaking processes, while
recognizing the diverse authoritative sources of the tax laws, including the
agency charged with their administration. The two breakthroughs are (1)
the requirement that generally only "authority" as defined for purposes of
section 6662 may be considered in determining whether a position reflects
the requirements of "law," 2 and (2) the recognition that administrative
interpretations, including revenue rulings and notices, 29 may not be disre-
garded in determining the requirements of "law." 30
Arguably, deviation from existing practitioner norms is inconsistent with
congressional intent to conform the penalty standard to ABA and AICPA
standards of professional conduct and calls into question the validity of the
penalty regulations3' (although not the Circular 230 practice regulations,
which have an independent statutory basis). However, the legislative history
of section 6694 indicates that the statutory standard was intended to reflect,
but perhaps not duplicate, existing practitioner standards. The House Report
states that the statutory standard "generally reflects the professional conduct
standards applicable to lawyers and certified public accountants. ' 32 More-
over, practitioners do not agree on a single meaning of "realistic possibility
of success." 33 The ABA and AICPA have somewhat different formulations
27. See William Raby, Salting the Voluntary Assessment System, 54 TAX NoTS 187,
189 (1992) (stating that "differences" between two standards are "impossible to really artic-
ulate").
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1991). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii)
(1991).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(0 (1991).
30. See Raby, supra note 27 (commenting that regulations "superficially track the tax
practitioner standards reflected in ABA Opinion 85-352 and AICPA Statement on Responsi-
bilities in Tax Practice No. 1"). Mr. Raby argues, however; that because of the limitation on
authorities on which the practitioner may rely in determining whether a realistic possibility of
success on the merits exists "to those [authorities] that are admissible in determining 'substantial
authority' under the taxpayer test," the regulatory standard actually is "at odds with basic
interpretation of what those [practitioner] standards mean." Id.
31. I. BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDs oF TAX PRACTICE 5005.03 (New Devel-
opments 1992).
32. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 25, at 1396 (emphasis supplied). See Stark, supra
note 12 (observing that "context of the term in Section 6694 ... suggests that Congress may
have intended for 'realistic possibility' to mean something more" than "a reasonable litigating
position").
33. See, e.g., Stark, supra note 12, at 136 (observing that "the meaning of the 'realistic
possibility' language is unclear").
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of "realistic possibility, 3 4 but they cannot even agree within their organi-
zations as to its substantive content and application. Considerable contro-
versy surrounds the proper interpretation of the ABA standard.' 5 Thus, a
rough approximation of the practitioner standard was the best that Treasury
could have hoped to achieve. In addition, the proposed regulations succeed
in articulating a more administrable standard. The limitation of authorities
objectifies the "realistic possibility" standard,36 whereas the list of consid-
erations that a practitioner may incorporate into an assessment of "realistic
possibility" is open-ended. That the objectivity achieved by the Treasury
formulation vastly improves the administrability of the preparer regulations
over the practitioner standards may supply a "reasonable" ground to
support the administrative interpretation.
A. Ascertaining the Existence of a Realistic Possibility
Under the preparer penalty regulations "[a] position is considered to
have a realistic possibility of [success] if a reasonable and well-informed
analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax law would lead such a person
to conclude that the position has approximately a one-in-three, or greater,
likelihood of being sustained on its merits." Whether the position is likely
to prevail must be determined without regard to the likelihood that the
34. See Randall W. Roth & Douglas C. Smith, Current Ethical Problems in Advising
Clients C482 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 773 (1990) (suggesting AICPA standard of "realistic possibility
of being upheld, administratively or judicially, on its merits" represents approximately 25%
chance of success and ABA standard of "realistic possibility of success if litigated" represents
approximately 30% chance). But see Tax Division, AICPA, Comments on Notice 90-20
Regarding Accuracy Related and Preparer Penalties, Submitted to the Internal Revenue Service
(June 1, 1990), reprinted in TAX NoTEs TODAY 153-14 (July 24, 1990) (expressing view that a
mathematical approach is inappropriate because determination of odds is impossible, thus
realistic possibility of success cannot be expressed in terms of percentage odds). However, the
ABA and AICPA appeared to agree on a standard for purposes of comments on the 1986
proposed amendments to Circular 230.
35. See ABA Civil Penalties Task Force Comments on Notice 90-20 (asserting that
meaning of realistic possibility standard "is still debated in the Tax Section," with some
members arguing that one-in-three chance of success appears to be "inappropriately high").
Compare, e.g., Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, reprinted in 39
TAx LAW. 635, 637-39 (1986) (asserting that Opinion 85-352 establishes elevated standard with
both objective and subjective components, requiring not only subjective belief but also
objectively realistic possibility of at least one-in-three chance of success) with Calvin H.
Johnson, Tax Return Positions in Contempt of Civil Penalties, 33 TAX Noas 501, 502 (1986)
(stating that realistic possibility is merely restatement, clarification, of reasonable basis) and
Stark, supra note 12, at 136 (reporting as "unsuccessful" efforts to require one-in-three
chance).
36. Graetz, supra note 14 (observing that 'substantial authority' standard was explicitly
chosen by Congress to provide a different and more objective requirement than the reasonable
basis test." "While this is a long way from a self-executing legal standard ... the substantial
authority requirement does introduce an element of objectivity into the standard of conduct.").
Cf. Raby, supra note 27, at 189 (observing that regulations "simplify the practitioner versus
taxpayer conflict" inherent in statutory scheme).
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Service will, in fact, raise the issue.3 7 Like the preparer standard, the
proposed Circular 230 standard is framed in terms of a one-in-three likeli-
hood of being sustained on the merits. 8
The one-in-three formulation has been criticized as both too demanding
and not demanding enough, because predictions of the odds of success are
inherently speculative and subjective. My own objection to this formulation
as advanced by the ABA Section of Taxation was that it accorded private
individuals unaccountable lawmaking authority.3 9 However, the Treasury
standard imports accountability by limiting the basis of undisclosed return
positions to judgments of politically authorized decisionmakers. The Trea-
sury's "realistic possibility" standard really does not call for a predictive
undertaking at all, but prescribes a mode of reasoning, with legal authority
as the premise. Although phrased as a process of paralleling authoritative
decisionmaking, to the extent that existing authority is the basis of the
position, the legitimacy of the position does not depend upon the odds that
a future politically authorized decisionmaker would support the position.
The standard rests, then, not so much on a lawyer's definition of law to
be a prediction of what the courts would decide, but rather, on a definition
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1991).
38. 57 Fed. Reg. 46,356, 46,359 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10) (proposed Oct. 8,
1992). However, the proposed regulations fall short of adopting a Circular 230 standard of
conduct identical to the preparer penalty standard, and this raises issues that require express
resolution. The Circular 230 standard appears to deviate from the preparer penalty provisions
in two ways. First, Circular 230 does not expressly incorporate Treasury Regulation § 1.6694-
2(b)(1), which prescribes that the weight accorded authority is to be determined based on its
relevance and persuasiveness as under the accuracy-related penalties. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(ii) (1991). This omission may give rise to the question of what it means for a position
to have a realistic possibility of being "sustained on its merits," which one commentator has
suggested could refer to a "hazards of litigation" settlement standard. William L. Raby,
Circular 230 Still Leaves Gaps Between Profession and the IRS, 57 TAx NoTES 511, 512 (Oct.
26,1992). This omission also eliminates the provision that recognizes "a well-reasoned construc-
tion of the applicable statutory provision" as support for a position despite the absence of
"certain types of authority."
Additionally, the proposed Circular 230 standard does not expressly prohibit advising
that a position contrary to a regulation be reported without disclosure, although § 6694(b)
would subject to a penalty a practitioner who did so advise a client, even if the position met
the reasonable possibility of success standard. As the most minimal respect for client autonomy
would dictate, the proposed amendments would require that the practitioner advise clients of
their liability for penalty for disregard of rules and regulations under § 6662(a)(1) and explain
the special requirements for adequate disclosure of a position contrary to a regulation. However,
as presently formulated, the proposed amendments appear to allow advising nondisclosure of
a position contrary to a regulation if it meets the realistic possibility standard. While a single
instance may not justify discipline, such conduct ought to be identified as a violation of the
Circular 230 standard and certainly taken into account in determining if there is a pattern of
conduct that warrants discipline. But see Rita L. Zeidner, Service Proposes New Return
Preparer Guidance, 57 TAx Nom~s (Tax Analysts) 296, 298 (1992) (quoting Gerald Portney,
director of tax practice at KPMG Peat Marwick in Washington to effect that requirement that
practitioners let their clients know exactly which penalties could result from their risky positions
forces practitioners to "play cops" for IRS).
39. Gwen T. Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, supra note 9.
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of "law" based upon what politically authorized decisionmakers have
already articulated.
Most important is the requirement that, in making the determination
of whether a realistic possibility of success supports a position under both
the preparer penalty and Circular 230 regulations, preparers may consider
only the "authorities" expressly allowed under the substantial authority
regulations. 4° The definition of "authorities" excludes conclusions reached
in treatises, legal periodicals, legal opinions or opinions rendered by other
tax professionals who do not hold positions of political authority. The
preparer penalty regulations also incorporate Treasury Regulation section
1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii), which prescribes the "nature of analysis"-weight ac-
corded authority and determination of relevance and persuasiveness-for
determining whether substantial authority exists. 41 This provision applies for
purposes of determining whether the position satisfies the realistic possibility
standard, although the weight of authorities supporting the taxpayer's
position need not be "substantial in relation to the weight of authorities
supporting contrary treatment." 42 However, a balancing analysis necessarily
implies that if contrary authority exists, then at least a single authority must
support the taxpayer's position.
43
The determination of whether "realistic possibility" supports a position
is not left to the taxpayer's or adviser's judgment as to the equity of an
outcome, but instead, with reference to "authority. '" 44 The Treasury has
held fast in defining "authority" to include only judgments of politically
authorized decisionmakers. It is true that courts take account of opinions
in treatises and periodicals, "so practitioners find it hard to accept the fact
that they cannot do likewise"; 45 but courts are politically authorized deci-
sionmakers and practitioners are not." The Treasury regulations include
one limited exception to the general requirement that a practitioner may
consider only "authority" in ascertaining whether a realistic possibility
exists. The "nature of analysis" incorporated into the preparer regulations
provides that "a well-reasoned construction of the applicable statutory
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3) (iii) (1991). Unlike the substantial authority standard,
however, the realistic possibility standard requires that the status of authority generally must
be determined as of the date of the return rather than as of the end of the tax year at issue.
Id. § 1.6694-3(b)(5).
41. Id. § 1.6694-2(b)(1).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) (1991) (emphasis added).
43. See Galler, supra note 18, at 847 (noting that "where the only existing authority is
a revenue ruling" taxpayers must choose among complying with ruling, disclosing position or
risking penalty).
44. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3), Example 2 (as amended in 1991).
45. Raby, supra note 38, at 512.
46. Another means to limit pratitioners' pronouncements as to the requirements of law
is the requirement that undisclosed return positions must reflect the law as of the date of the
return rather than as of the end of the tax year at issue. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(b)(5) (as
amended in 1991).
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provision" counts as support for a position despite the absence of "certain
types of authority.
' 47
Although some of the illustrative examples under the preparer penalty
regulations48 raise as many questions as they answer, the examples provide
guidance as to how to resolve ambiguities in the revenue statutes with
appropriate deference to the judgments of politically authorized decision-
makers. Examples under section 6694(a) indicate that private views must
give way to politically authorized judgments, although one example suggests
that a position may be considered to meet the "realistic possibility standard"
without any supporting "authority" if the only contrary authority is a
proposed regulation or private ruling.
49
Example five under regulation section 1.6694-2(b)(3) posits a statute
that is silent as to whether a taxpayer may take a certain position on the
taxpayer's 1991 federal income tax return. Three private letter rulings issued
to other taxpayers in 1987 and 1988 support the taxpayer's position.
However, proposed regulations issued in 1990 are clearly contrary to the
taxpayer's position. The explanation reiterates that only "authority" as
defined under section 6662 may be considered and that after issuance of
proposed regulations, inconsistent private rulings are no longer authority. 0
According to the preamble to the final preparer regulations, "proposed
regulations are subject to a higher level of review than private rulings and
it is not appropriate to retain as an authority a document that does not
accurately reflect the current status of the law and position of the [IRS]." ' 5'
Therefore, lawyers should not take the rulings into account in determining
whether the position satisfies the realistic possibility standard.
However, the explanation of the example states that the position con-
trary to the proposed regulations may or may not satisfy the realistic
possibility standard, depending on an analysis of all the relevant authorities.
The existence of authorities other than those specifically mentioned-au-
thorities supporting the reported position-may be implied. However, an
alternative interpretation is that, even without the support of any "au-
thority," a position can have a realistic possibility of success if the only
contrary authority is a proposed regulation, depending on the relative quality
of the reasoning underlying the proposed regulations and the preparer's
construction of the statute.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1991). The proposed amendments to Circular 230
do not incorporate this provision. See supra note 38. The implication of omitting this exception
to the general rule that only authority may be counted in assessing whether a position has a
realistic possibility of success is that such a position must be supported by at least one authority
even if no contrary authority exists. If at least one authority does not exist, the practitioner
must advise disclosure of the position. If this omission was an oversight, the final regulations
will probably remedy it.
48. No examples exist under the proposed revisions to Circular 230.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(3), Example 5 (as amended in 1991).
50. Id.
51. T.D. 8382, 1992-1 C.B. 392, 394.
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This seems inconsistent with the proposition that only "authority" under
section 6662 may be considered in determining the existence of a realistic
possibility. It would seem that if only one authority exists, and that authority
is contrary to the position, the position could not be supported by a realistic
possibility of success. However, the incorporated substantial understatement
regulations state that substantial authority for a position may exist despite
the absence of "certain types of authority," and so "a taxpayer may have
substantial authority for a position that is supported only by a well-reasoned
construction of the applicable statutory provision."15 2 The regulations fail
to explain which "certain types of authority" were meant. However, example
five suggests that a well-reasoned construction of the statute may establish
a realistic possibility of success absent contrary authority more weighty than
proposed regulations and private rulings, which carry even less weight than
proposed regulations. It may be that a proposed regulation, which counts
as "authority" but not as a "rule or regulation," is of such minimal weight
that a well-reasoned construction of a statute is sufficient counterweight to
establish a one-in-three likelihood of success.
To nail down the distinction between "authority" and personal opinion,
Treasury regulation section 1.6694-2(b)(3), examples seven and eight state
that judicial and administrative interpretations of other provisions of the
Code or other federal or state law, are not "authority" for purposes of
determining the meaning of the same words in a separate provision. Of
course, as in the case of conclusions reached in treatises and legal periodicals,
the authorities underlying the judicial and administrative decisions may be
relevant to determining whether the taxpayer's position meets the realistic
possibility standard, and the interpretations themselves are relevant in ar-
riving at a well-reasoned construction of the language at issue. However,
the context in which the language arises also must be taken into account in
determining whether the position satisfies the realistic possibility standard.
B. Deference to Administrative Authority
Perhaps even more significant than the definition of "authority" is new
Code section 6694(b) which imposes on return preparers a $1,000 penalty,
reduced by any amount paid under section 6694(a), for an understatement
due to either (1) "a willful attempt" to understate tax liability, equated
under the regulations with disregard of facts "in an attempt wrongfully to
reduce the [client's] tax liability" 3; or (2) "reckless or intentional disregard
of rules or regulations," or in other words, a disregard of law.14 Consistent
with former section 6694, the Treasury has defined "rules and regulations"
to include Code provisions, temporary or final Treasury regulations, and
52. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1991) (applying to determination of realistic possibility
of success on merits by virtue of regulation § 1.6694-2(b)(1)).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(b) (as amended in 1991).
54. I.R.C. § 6694(b) (1988).
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revenue rulings.5 The Treasury also has added notices published in the
Internal Revenue Bulletin.16 The Statute provides no express exception for
disclosure; but the legislative history indicates that rules and regulations
contradicted by a disclosed position are not considered disregarded if the
reported position is not frivolous,57 and the regulations provide a disclosure
exception. A position contrary to a regulation must represent a good faith
challenge to the validity of the regulation, 5 and the disclosure must ade-
quately identify the rule or regulation being challenged. 9
Another nonstatutory exception to the penalty for disregard of rules or
regulations provides that a preparer will not be penalized for an understate-
ment due to a position contrary to a revenue ruling or notice if the position
satisfies the realistic possibility standard.60 Due to this provision, the regu-
lations under the section 6694(b) penalty for disregard of rules and regu-
lations also provide guidance as to the content of "realistic possibility."
The section 6694(b) regulations indicate that a personal view, even though
"well-reasoned," is inadequate to justify representing a position contrary
to a revenue ruling as consistent with law.
Regulation section 1.6694-3(d), example four illustrates the applicability
of the disclosure exception to the prohibition against reporting a position
contrary to a regulation. Example four posits two authorities relevant to a
taxpayer's situation: (1) final regulations that require capitalization of certain
expenses incurred in the purchase of a business and (2) a Tax Court opinion,
expressly holding the regulations invalid. The explanation states that advising
a deduction contrary to the regulations without adequate disclosure will
subject the preparer to the section 6694(b) penalty even though it "may"
have a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits. On these facts,
the position may be reported if adequately disclosed because it represents a
good faith challenge to the validity of the regulations. 6'
Considered together with example three under regulation section 1.6694-
3(d), example four also may help illumine the content of a "realistic
possibility" sufficient to balance a revenue ruling. Example three posits,
instead of a regulation, a revenue ruling that holds that the expenses incurred
in the purchase of a business must be capitalized and several cases from
different courts that hold that these particular expenses may be deducted
currently. No other authority exists. The explanation states that taking the
deduction without disclosure is not reckless or intentional disregard of a
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(f) (as amended in 1991).
56. Id. Revenue procedures may or may not be treated as "rules or regulations"
depending on facts and circumstances. Id.
57. H.R. RP. No. 247, supra note 25 ("specified disclosure tends to demonstrate that
there was no intentional disregard of rules and regulations").
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(c)(2) (as amended in 1991).
59. Id. § 1.6694-3(e).
60. Id. § 1.6694-3(c)(3). A similar exception applies for purposes of the disregard penalty
on taxpayers under the § 6662 regulations.
61. Id. at § 1.6694-3(d), Example 4.
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rule because a preparer may report without disclosure a position contrary
to a revenue ruling if it has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its
merits.62 The preamble explains that the example in the final regulations
refers to "several" rather than to "five" courts used in the proposed
regulations in response to comments that the proposed regulations "created
a negative inference that a position supported by fewer than five courts
would not satisfy the standard" when "[n]o such inference was intended. '63
Thus, example three explicitly contemplates that fewer than five relevant
and persuasive judicial opinions may justify reporting a position contrary
to a revenue ruling. A single Tax Court opinion may be sufficient because
example four states that a position contrary to a regulation, more weighty
authority than a revenue ruling, that was held invalid by only one Tax
Court decision "may" have a realistic possibility of being sustained on its
merits.
The regulations do not address directly the circumstance in which a
revenue ruling is the only "authority" on the issue. However, the several
examples together imply that a well-reasoned construction of the statute is
not sufficient by itself to counterbalance a revenue ruling, which is weightier
authority than a letter ruling or proposed regulation. A revenue ruling is
an authority of sufficient weight to count as a "rule or regulation," and
the reference in example three to "several" court opinions contrary to the
revenue ruling implies that at least some authority must support a position
contrary to a revenue ruling to satisfy the realistic possibility of success
standard. These examples also raise the question whether one Tax Court
opinion may be the equal of "several" opinions from unidentified courts.
C. Identification of Ambiguity
Finally, the Treasury leaves no room for representing private judgment
as law if the statute is "not ambiguous" and implicitly addresses the question
of how "ambiguity" is to be defined and identified. Practitioners must
adhere to the literal meaning of the words of a statute and not engage in
searches of the legislative history or free-floating speculation as to legislative
intent to identify ambiguity. Lawyers, particularly, are trained to appreciate
the potential for ambiguity in all language and can be quite condescending
toward the notion that a provision is "clear." But the Treasury has
prescribed a strict plain meaning approach, rejecting classic lawyerly justi-
fications for deviating from apparent meaning.
The inequity of a potential application of the statute does not give rise
to ambiguity that the lawyer may resolve in favor of equity and report,
without disclosure, as "law" on a client's return. 4 Treasury regulation
section 1.6694-2(b)(3), example two posits a client who manufactures widg-
ets, a new Code provision that provides no deduction for certain expenses
62. Id. § 1.6694-3(d), Example 3.
63. T.D. 8382, 1992-1 C.B. 392, 394.
64. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6694-2(b)(3), Example 2 (as amended in 1991).
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allowed under prior law, and a practitioner who believes that the new statute
is inequitable as applied to the client's situation. No regulations or other
authority exist under the new statute except the statutory language and
committee reports. If the committee reports do not specifically address the
client's situation, a position contrary to the statute does not satisfy the
realistic possibility standard. A well-reasoned construction of the statute
does not constitute a realistic possibility in the face of "unambiguous"
statutory language.
Neither does inconsistency between the statutory language and state-
ments in committee reports give rise to ambiguity that the lawyer is justified
in resolving without disclosure.65 Treasury Regulation section 1.6694-2(b)(3),
example three provides that a position has a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits if a conflict exists between the "unambiguous"
general language of a statute which adversely affects the client's transaction
and a specific statement in the committee reports that such transactions are
not adversely affected. However, the position disregards "a rule or regu-
lation" and so the preparer must disclose.66
The regulations are silent as to whether the "inequity" of an application
of a statute is sufficient basis to support reporting the position, with
disclosure, as nonfrivolous. Approval is implied, however, because the
Treasury does acknowledge that a position consistent with the committee
report may have a realistic possibility of success, even though the preparer
must disclose the position to avoid "disregard of rules or regulations."
Implicitly, then, the Treasury acknowledges that the courts may uphold a
nonliteral, intentionalist, or perhaps even nonintentionalist "equitable" read-
ing of the statutory terms, although the lawyer is foreclosed from making
that decision independently without the benefit of an authorized decision-
making forum.
The "plain meaning" approach, of course, does not eliminate all
statutory ambiguity.67 If the statute is ambiguous within the strict definition
provided by the regulations, selection of the applicable meaning generally
must be determined considering only "authority" as defined for purposes
of section 6662 and in conformance with "rules and regulations." In the
absence of weighty authority, an adviser's sound independent interpretation
of a statute may stand in for law.
CONCLUSION
The definition of law implicit in the regulations is not entirely theoret-
ically satisfying or internally consistent. It does not make sense to say that
the "law" is the "literal" meaning of a statute if it is at odds with the
explicit intention of the drafter reliably memorialized in a committee report.
The words of a statute are recognized as law and graffiti is not because of
65. Id. § 1.6694-2(b)(3), Example 3.
66. Id.
67. See Handelman, supra note 18, at 633-39.
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their different sources. The regulations generally embrace the view that the
identity of the source determines the legal authority of words. It is incoherent
then to take the view that it does not matter what the author meant.
Nevertheless, I endorse the approach adopted by the regulations on the
grounds of their administrability. Reasonable people may differ over what
is equitable or what a reasonable legislator might have considered equitable.
Reasonable people also may disagree as to whether legislative history in fact
reflects legislative intent or instead represents a cynical manipulation and
abuse of the legislative process by a counter-majoritarian special interest
group. However, by articulating for tax practitioners expectations of respect
for legitimate lawmaking authority, the Treasury has kindly but firmly
ordained that, henceforth, taxpayers and their advisers may substitute their
own private speculation for those of duly-constituted public authorities only
if their views are disclosed as not, or not yet, "law."
